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39 
Avoidance, Evasion, and Taxpayer Morality 
Allison Christians 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 1, 2013, the Washington University School of Law 
hosted a colloquium on the topic of “Conceptualizing a New 
Institutional Framework for International Taxation,” inviting 
participants to consider the pressures on the current institutional tax 
governance structure and the prospects for reform. In my opening 
remarks, I sought to outline the pressures being brought upon 
national tax systems through media coverage of the observed tax 
behaviors of various multinationals and wealthy individuals, which 
have provoked social protest and sustained campaigns for tax justice 
by activist individuals and global nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs).
1
 I suggested that both the media and the activists were, in 
effect, combining tax evasion and tax avoidance into a single tax 
compliance framework with which to build a single message about 
the integral role of morality in taxpayer behavior. 
However, a turn to morality to avoid delineating in law between 
that which is illegal (evasion) and that which is not (avoidance) is 
counterproductive to the pursuit of coherent tax policy in the long 
run. The turn to morality is understandable in that it attempts to 
define a space for social pressure to mount against ongoing perceived 
tax injustice. But the turn is dangerous in that it confirms the 
legitimacy of a century-old tradition of using non-legal, “soft law” 
 
   Allison Christians, H. Heward Stikeman Chair in Taxation, McGill University 
Faculty of Law. Thanks for thoughtful review and insightful comments are due to Diane Ring, 
Adam Rosenzweig, and Lee Sheppard, as well as to the conveners and participants of the 
“Conceptualizing a New Institutional Framework for International Taxation” colloquium at 
Washington University; and to Montano Cabezas for his excellent research assistance. 
 1. See also Allison Christians, Tax Activists and the Global Movement for Development 
through Transparency, in TAX, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 288 (Miranda Stewart & Yariv 
Brauner eds., 2013). 
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standards to push tax policy in a given direction.
2
 Doing so has 
potentially grave consequences for the future of tax policy on a 
global scale.  
Turning to soft law mechanisms to regulate taxpayer behavior 
implicitly accepts as appropriate an existing global system in which 
taxation in practice has involved little more than an inter-nation 
political contest situated fundamentally in the logic of “pay-to-play” 
and “might makes right.” It is not a foregone conclusion that 
countering this dominant and entrenched structure must be done on 
its own terms. But accepting soft law terms without question suggests 
that failure is a foregone conclusion.  
This Essay fleshes out the case for caution in employing morality 
as a stop-gap measure to avoid drawing a regulated line between tax 
evasion and tax avoidance, while still meting out punishment within 
the undefined space between these two poles. It suggests that the 
alternate view—that taxpayer behavior must be managed by law 
rather than social sanction—has the best chance of driving tax policy 
toward greater coherence in the long run.
3
  
This alternate view, that tax policy must be contained in law, does 
not mean the public must be uninvolved in policy discourse; the 
opposite is clearly true. The public seems uniquely suited to the task 
of demanding transparency in governance as a mechanism for 
monitoring lawmaking and addressing tax policy problems. 
Transparency is of course an imperfect mechanism, but it seems to be 
the best hope for achieving justice across a wide variety of 
governance-related failures of which unjust taxation is a prominent 
example.
4
 Transparency forms the central core of all contemporary 
treatments of the problem of governance, and there is no reason why 
 
 2.  See generally Allison Christians, Hard Law & Soft Law in International Taxation, 25 
WISC. J. INT’L L. 325 (2007).  
 3. This is not to suggest that social sanction, such as through naming and shaming, has 
no place in policy discourse. As the corporate social responsibility literature attests, naming and 
shaming can have enormous impact on shaping behavior for the social good. Importantly, the 
strategy can lead to reforms that were otherwise effectively impossible due to uneven influence 
over lawmaking spheres. See, e.g., JOHN RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2012). 
 4. Allison Christians, Drawing the Boundaries of Tax Justice, in THE QUEST FOR TAX 
REFORM CONTINUES: THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION FIFTY YEARS LATER 53 (Kim 
Brooks ed., 2013). 
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it should not also define the contours of thinking about what 
behaviors should be acceptable when it comes to taxation. For this 
reason, this Essay concludes that the problem of distinguishing tax 
avoidance from tax evasion presents a base case for demanding 
transparency in both tax information and tax lawmaking, in the 
service of pursuing tax justice. 
I. HOW DID WE GET HERE? 
To understand how we got to a place where tax avoidance and tax 
evasion have been characterized as questions of morality, and why 
these concepts should instead lead us invariably toward the rule of 
law, a brief review of the contemporary tax policy landscape is 
required. Two media-based exposés of international taxation combine 
to produce the source material for this exploration. The first, 
involving the “offshore leaks” database obtained and reported on by 
the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ),
5
 
taught the public about an epidemic of tax evasion spreading across 
the globe. The second, the ongoing media coverage of single-digit 
effective tax rates paid on a global basis by household brand 
companies like GE, Google, Apple, Starbucks, and Amazon, taught 
the public about an epidemic of tax avoidance, often characterized as 
“aggressive” to move it conceptually closer to the concept of 
evasion.
6
   
 
 5. Secrecy for Sale: Inside the Global Offshore Money Maze, INT’L CONSORTIUM 
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS, http://www.icij.org/offshore (last visited Jan. 2, 2014). 
 6. See David Kocieniewski, GE’s Strategies Let It Avoid Taxes Altogether, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 24, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/business/economy/25tax 
.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps 
Billions in Taxes, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/ 
29/business/apples-tax-strategy-aims-at-low-tax-states-and-nations.html; Matt Warman, Google 
Pays Just £6m UK Tax, TELEGRAPH, Aug. 8, 2012, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
technology/google/9460950/Google-pays-just-6m-UK-tax.html; Christina Patterson, Google, 
Starbucks, and Amazon . . . For These Multinationals Immorality is Now Standard Practice, 
INDEPENDENT, Nov. 13, 2012, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/ 
gogoog-starbucks-and-amazon-for-these-multinationals-immorality-is-now-standard-practice-
8313038.html; Vanessa Barford & Gerry Holt, Google, Amazon, Starbucks: The Rise of ‘Tax 
Shaming’, BBC NEWS (May 21, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-20560359; Tax 
Paid by Some Global Firms in UK ‘An Insult’, BBC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.bbc 
.co.uk/news/business-20559791. 
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A. The Evasion Story 
The evasion story is a simple one, involving a clear question of 
governance failure for which the moral case seems virtually 
unambiguous.
7
 Reporters who analyzed the ICIJ offshore leaks 
database found that “alongside perfectly legal transactions, the 
secrecy and lax oversight offered by the offshore world allows fraud, 
tax dodging and political corruption to thrive.”8 Related stories 
abound, including the ongoing saga between the United States and 
Switzerland with respect to marketing efforts by UBS to secrecy-
seeking American customers,
9
 a similar dispute between Germany 
and Liechtenstein,
10
 and the “Lagarde list” furnished to Giorgios 
Papakonstantinou—then the Greek Finance Minister—with the 
names of some 2,000 Greek residents, many with top government 
credentials, who were holding cash in secret Swiss bank accounts.
11
 
The information contained in this steady stream of leaks produced a 
flood of media coverage that has moved activists to take issue with 
how governments manage the financial affairs of high-net-worth 
individuals.  
 
 7. Leaving aside those for whom all taxation is simplistically viewed as either theft or 
slavery or both. 
 8. Abby Ohlheiser, The Secret World of Tax Havens Just Got a Whole Lot Less Secret, 
SLATE (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2013/04/04/offshore_leaks_tax_ 
haven_report_over_2_5_million_document_leak_reveals_details.html. 
 9. See, e.g., Nick Mathiason, Tax Scandal Leaves Swiss Giant Reeling, OBSERVER, June 
28, 2008, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/jun/29/ubs.banking. 
 10. See Germans Admit Tax Evasion as Scandal Widens to US, Australia, DEUTSCHE 
WELLE (Feb. 26, 2008), http://dw.de/p/DDmr. This scandal became so widespread that it 
became popularly known as the “Liechstenstein tax affair.” See 2008 Liechtenstein Tax Affair, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Liechtenstein_tax_affair. 
 11. The story of the Lagarde list was broken by investigative journalist Kostas Vaxevanis, 
who published the list after learning that the Greek government had altered it to remove key 
names and was otherwise disinclined to pursue prosecutions based on its contents. See 
Editorial, Greece Arrests the Messenger, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2012, available at http://www 
.nytimes.com/2012/10/30/opinion/greece-arrests-the-messenger.html. Vaxevanis was arrested 
for violating the privacy rights of those named in the list and is currently facing a second trial 
on the same issue after being acquitted in November 2012. Greek Bank List Editor Costas 
Vaxevanis Acquitted, BBC NEWS (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-
20172516; Helena Smith, Greek Editor Kostas Vaxevanis Faces Retrial Over ‘Lagarde List’ 
Revelation, GUARDIAN, Nov. 16, 2012, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/ 
nov/16/greek-editor-kostas-vaxevanis-retrial; Helena Smith, Greek Journalist’s Retrial Over 
Lagarde List Postponed, GUARDIAN, Oct. 8, 2013, available at http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2013/oct/08/greek-retrial-kostas-vaxevanis-lagarde-list-postponed.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol44/iss1/8
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The question this story clearly raises is why governments cannot 
or will not prevent this patently illegal and obviously objectionable 
behavior. One possibility is that governments cannot prevent this 
behavior; the other is that they can do so but choose not to for 
political reasons. The media coverage itself, and the response of 
activists in using such coverage to rally for a very specific set of tax 
policy reforms, suggests that the clear answer to tax evasion is greater 
public oversight, to oversee the efforts (or lack thereof) of 
governments to fairly enforce their own laws and to pressure 
governments to remedy past practices of lax enforcement, if better 
enforcement is possible.
12
  
One place where activists have sought avenues for such oversight 
is within the architecture of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Formed as part of the 
reconstruction effort in the post-war era, the OECD is not primarily a 
source of international law but rather a forum for consensus-building 
among its member nations, which include the United States, Canada, 
and EU countries, but not Brazil, China, or India. The OECD is thus 
a transnational network, and its tax division is a tightly knit epistemic 
community whose main purpose is to create spaces for government 
officials to collaborate with business and industry leaders to frame 
issues of international tax policy, formulate norms, and syndicate 
these norms globally through domestic lawmaking procedures.
13
 This 
institutional structure has had tremendous consequences for the 
formation of global tax policy, and serves as a warning about the role 
of norms, non-state actors, and institutions in tax policy matters more 
generally.
14
 
 
 12. See, e.g., ROBERT S. MCINTYRE ET AL., CORP. TAXPAYERS & CORP. TAX DODGERS 
2008–10 (2011), available at http://www.ctj.org/corporatetaxdodgers/CorporateTaxDodgers 
Report.pdf; FACTCOALITION, TAX REFORM, available at  http://tjn-usa.org/storage/documents/ 
FACT_Tax_Policy_101911.pdf; FACTCOALITION, INCONVENIENT REALITIES ON CORP. TAX: 
LOOPHOLES, TAX BREAKS & SUBSIDIES TELL THE REAL STORY ON THE CORP. TAX RATE, 
available at http://tjn-usa.org/storage/documents/FACT_Sheet_CORPTAX_DRAFT.pdf. 
 13. Allison Christians, Networks, Norms, and National Tax Policy, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL 
STUD. L. REV. 1, 22 (2010). 
 14. The OECD is capable of exercising centralized coercive authority even if it does not 
dispense international “law,” and many commentators have gone so far as to accept OECD 
declarations in tax matters as largely equivalent to law in practice. See Christians, Hard Law & 
Soft Law in International Taxation, supra note 2, at 325–29. 
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The OECD began addressing the problem of offshore tax evasion 
in 1996, when it developed an appreciation of how tax havens—
many of which are controlled possessions and territories of OECD 
member countries—were eroding the revenue-raising ability of many 
of the member countries.
15
 Two years later, the OECD published a 
report that developed criteria to identify harmful tax competition, and 
recommended as a counteractive solution a proposed blacklist of 
countries that were to be targeted with various sanctions unless they 
started sharing tax information with leading OECD countries 
pursuant to OECD standards.  
After extensive lobbying against the project by the United States, 
Switzerland, and Luxembourg, the OECD ultimately reduced its 
work to an easily attainable compliance threshold. A country would 
be removed from tax haven blacklists by having in place at least 
twelve tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) pursuant to 
OECD-drafted model language.
16
 These TIEAs arranged actual 
information exchange among countries in such a way as to continue 
the status quo unabated; indeed, evasion may have even increased in 
countries that had not been subjected to OECD scrutiny, such as the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland.
17
  
Consequently, despite aspirational declarations by world leaders 
that the OECD had ended the era of bank secrecy in 2009, in fact, the 
opposite was true.
18
 Yet because the institution had set the parameters 
of its own success, little recourse was available. The Tax Justice 
 
 15. For a more thorough review of the OECD’s work on tax evasion, see Allison 
Christians, Sovereignty, Taxation, and Social Contract, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 99 (2009). 
 16. Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Part 4: Ineffectual 
Information Sharing, 53 TAX NOTES INT’L 1139 (2009) (“The standard OECD information 
exchange agreement is nearly worthless.”); Michael McIntyre, How to End the Charade of 
Information Exchange, 56 TAX NOTES INT’L 255 (2009) (outlining why OECD exchange 
agreements are ineffective and the OECD list of tax havens a “joke”). 
 17. See, e.g., TIEAs: A Norwegian Update, TAX JUST. NETWORK (Apr. 20, 2011, 5:57 
AM), http://taxjustice.blogspot.ca/2011/04/tieas-norwegian-update.html; see also TIEAs: 23 is 
the Magic Number, TAX JUST. NETWORK (Sept. 8, 2010, 9:24 AM), http://taxjustice 
.blogspot.com/2010/09/tieas-23-is-magic-number.html. 
 18. LONDON SUMMIT 2009, GLOBAL PLAN FOR RECOVERY & REFORM (Apr. 2, 2009), 
available at http://web.archive.org/web/20100310215453/http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/ 
resources/en/news/15766232/communique-020409 (“We stand ready to deploy sanctions to 
protect our public finances and financial systems. The era of banking secrecy is over.”); 
McIntyre, supra note 16, at 255 (“Well, it’s not over yet.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol44/iss1/8
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Network—a Civil Society Organization formed from a coalition of 
researchers and activists focused on harmful tax practices—together 
with other NGOs and activists, took on the issue in various ways. 
Recent developments suggest their constant public criticism, 
combined with reports on the growing amount of cash believed to be 
hidden offshore, may be having some effect.
19
 For instance, the 
United States has adopted punishing new rules for tax evaders and 
the institutions that enable them.
20
 Other countries are considering 
similar legislation,
21
 and the OECD has a similarly motivated 
project.
22
  
Activists may see these developments as reasons for optimism, yet 
some glaring deficiencies remain in these regimes. The apparent 
unwillingness of leading nations to curb their own appeal as tax 
havens to the rest of the world continues to present obstacles to 
meaningful reform.
23
  
One may well wonder if the same governments that produced the 
circumstances for global tax evasion, and then pronounced its death 
four years ago after a highly contested global battle that lasted over a 
decade, can be believed when they say that this time, things are 
 
 19. JAMES HENRY, TAX JUST. NETWORK, THE PRICE OF OFFSHORE REVISITED: NEW 
ESTIMATES FOR ‘MISSING’ GLOBAL PRIVATE WEALTH, INCOME, INEQUALITY & LOST TAXES 
(July 2012), available at http://www.elcorreo.eu.org/IMG/pdf/Price_of_Offshore_Revisited_ 
72612.pdf. 
 20. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, Pub. L. No. 111–147, § 501, 124 Stat. 71 
(2010) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ 
PLAW-111publ147/pdf/PLAW-111publ147.pdf. 
 21. Salman Shaheen, UK to Impose Son of FATCA on Crown Dependencies, Despite 
Government’s Denials, INT’L TAX REV. (Nov. 23 2012), http://www.internationaltaxreview 
.com/Article/3121964/EXCLUSIVE-UK-to-impose-son-of-FATCA-on-Crown-Dependencies-
despite-governments-denials.html. 
 22. About the TRACE Project, ORG. ECON. COOP. DEV., http://www.oecd.org/ctp/ 
exchange-of-tax-information/aboutthetracegroup.htm (last visited Dec. 24, 2013); see generally 
ORG. ECON. COOP. DEV., TRACE IMPLEMENTATION PACKAGE (Jan. 23, 2013), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/TRACE_Implementation_Package_Web 
site.pdf. 
 23. See, e.g., Allison Christians, Putting the Reign Back in Sovereign: Advice for the 
Second Obama Administration, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1373 (2013); Anna Edgerton, Miami’s 
International Banking Clients Move Money to Protect Financial Privacy, MIAMI HERALD, July 
29, 2012, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/07/29/2920363/miamis-international-
banking-clients.html; Is the UK Serious About Tackling Tax Evasion? (Channel 4 News (UK) 
television broadcast Feb. 2, 2012), available at http://www.channel4.com/news/is-the-uk-
serious-about-tackling-tax-evasion. 
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different.
24
 But perhaps the even more troubling inquiry is what this 
process says about the possibilities for tax justice or fairness, 
however it may be articulated. If the rich countries of the world, 
marshaling their full and ample resources and with apparently clear 
will and determination, have so much trouble just confronting—never 
mind solving—the problem of tax evasion, how much less should be 
expected when the behavior in question is not so unambiguously 
objectionable, while potentially being even more valuable to its 
architects? The rhetoric on tax avoidance demonstrates there are no 
straightforward answers to this question. 
B. The Avoidance Story 
The avoidance story is more difficult, and it is here the problem of 
ambiguity in the use of morality as a non-legal behavioral control 
arises. The issue is that the world’s biggest multinational 
conglomerates manage to earn trillions of dollars around the world, 
yet many seem to pay virtually no tax anywhere. This is framed as a 
justice issue because it shifts the burden of taxpaying to those who 
cannot similarly avail themselves of sophisticated tax planning 
strategies, and it thereby delivers undue advantage to sprawling 
conglomerates over all other taxpaying members of society. In 
response to this injustice, tax justice advocates use the concept of 
morality to move some kinds of tax avoidance into the 
unambiguously immoral category of evasion, despite the failure of 
the law to do so.  
But this is a difficult move strategically in that it confronts a long 
tradition of tolerance, and even celebration, of tax avoidance 
behavior by taxpayers that is at once political, cultural, and legal in 
nature. In the United States, this doctrine is famously stated by 
Learned Hand in Helvering v. Gregory, as follows:  
Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as 
low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which 
 
 24. See, e.g., Lee Sheppard, News Analysis: OECD Tries to Fix Income Shifting, 69 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 627 (2013). 
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will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to 
increase one’s taxes.25  
The same sentiment is found in English common law, and has 
accordingly been adopted in the jurisprudence of other 
commonwealth countries, including Canada and Australia. Thus, in 
IRC v. Duke of Westminster, Baron Thomas Tomlin wrote: 
Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so as that the 
tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it 
otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to 
secure this result, then, however unappreciative the 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow taxpayers may 
be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay an increased 
tax.
26
 
Accordingly, when GE faced a public outcry over a media exposé of 
its global tax planning successes,
27
 a company representative replied 
that the company is “committed to complying with tax rules and 
paying all legally obliged taxes. At the same time, we have a 
responsibility to our shareholders to legally minimize our costs.”28 
Similarly, when Apple was criticized in the media for going to great 
lengths to avoid paying millions in taxes,
29
 the company responded 
that, in addition to being a job creator and a contributor to charitable 
causes, it “has conducted all of its business with the highest of ethical 
standards, complying with applicable laws and accounting rules.”30 
Generating public objection to tax avoidance in the face of a tradition 
of supportive legal jurisprudence and cultural understandings, 
including about the nature and the role of the corporation in society, 
is thus a potentially monumental task.  
 
 25. 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934). 
 26. See Duke of Westminster v. IRC, [1936] 19 D.T.C. 490, 520 (Can.); see also Ayrshire 
Pullman Motor Services and Ritchie v. IRC, [1929] 14 D.T.C. 754, 763 (Can.) (“No man in this 
country is under the smallest obligation, moral or other, so to arrange his legal relations to his 
business or to his property as to enable the Inland Revenue to put the largest possible shovel 
into his stores.”). 
 27. Kocieniewski, supra note 6. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Duhigg & Kocieniewski, supra note 6. 
 30. Apple’s Response on Its Tax Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/business/apples-response-on-its-tax-practices.html?_r=0. 
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Making tax avoidance a question of morality is a difficult terrain 
for activists. It automatically invokes actual tax compliance as a 
ready defense. But it also involves the interplay of various legal rules 
enacted by sovereign (and often democratic) governments, as well as 
the kind of political malfunction that allows special interest groups to 
influence and directly author the laws that regulate themselves and 
their clients—at a high cost to broader society.31 As a result, linking 
tax avoidance to morality seems to require telling a more complicated 
story about why an activity that is technically legal should 
nevertheless be publicly excoriated and ultimately punished.  
Some have tried to overcome this challenge by categorizing 
avoidance into “acceptable” and “aggressive” or, alternatively, 
“intended” and “abusive” forms. It follows that some kinds of 
avoidance—such as putting money in a tax-deferred retirement 
savings account—are morally cleared because they are intended by 
government; but other kinds of tax avoidance—such as assigning low 
value to intangibles sold to corporate subsidiaries in order to assign 
profits to low-tax jurisdictions—must be immoral because the 
behavior was not intended by legislators.
32
  
 
 31. The outsized influence wielded by business lobbyists is outlined in Raquel Alexander 
et al., Measuring Rates of Return for Lobbying Expenditures: An Empirical Case Study of Tax 
Breaks for Multinational Corporations, 25 J.L. & POL. 401, 441 (2009), which estimates the 
return on investment in political influence over tax policy matters to be as high as 22,000 
percent. Concerning the ability to author laws, professional firms are not always shy about their 
ability to shape the law when it comes to creating promotional materials. Corporations also 
partner with lobbyist–think-tank hybrids like the American Legislative Exchange Council 
(ALEC) to advance their interest through legislative proposals. See, e.g., AM. ASS’N FOR JUST., 
ALEC: GHOSTWRITING THE LAW FOR CORP. AM. (2010), available at 
http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/xbcr/justice/ALEC_Report.pdf; ALEC EXPOSED, http://www 
.alecexposed.org. For a discussion of political malfunction and its various forms, see Neil 
Komesar, In Search of a General Approach to Legal Analysis: A Comparative Institutional 
Alternative, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1350 (1981); Neil Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing 
Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1559 (1994). 
 32. See, e.g., Richard Murphy, Amazon, and Starbucks are Struggling to Defend Their 
Tax Avoidance, GUARDIAN, Nov. 13, 2012, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentis 
free/2012/nov/13/amazon-google-starbucks-tax-avoidance. Some commentators argue the 
transfer pricing issue is the crux of the problems surrounding the erosion of the corporate tax 
base. A unitary system of taxation, which would carve up a multinational corporation’s profits 
in a more substantively accurate manner, is often cited as the ideal solution to this problem. See, 
e.g., SOL PICCIOTTO, TAX JUST. NETWORK, TOWARDS UNITARY TAX. OF TRANSNAT’L CORPS. 
(2012), available at http://www.financialtransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/ 
Towards_Unitary_Taxation-1-1.pdf?80f948 (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol44/iss1/8
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This attempt to subcategorize an area of legal but objectionable 
tax avoidance is precarious. It involves drawing a line that 
governments themselves have failed to draw adequately, and places 
blame squarely on the taxpayer for behavior that is later deemed to 
have fallen on the wrong side of the line based on a rudimentary idea 
about what the politicians who wrote the law “intended.” This 
ignores the complex problem of political malfunction (or capture); 
namely, the outsized influence on tax lawmaking that is wielded by 
taxpayers who can take advantage of global financial markets and 
decentralized regulatory schemes to render themselves difficult or 
impossible to tax.
33
  
Thus, when Starbucks, GE, Apple, and countless other companies 
pledge their fidelity to all applicable laws, they fail to mention the 
many ways in which they influence the direction of tax law reform on 
a global basis.
34
 This influence not only includes direct lobbying 
efforts in national lawmaking processes but also involves the much 
more obscure yet equally important role multinational companies 
play in influencing tax policy through a panoply of other 
mechanisms. These range from direct and indirect political spending 
to so-called “native advertising,” pursuant to which promotional 
marketing is presented as journalism or even academic research. Such 
influence additionally extends to participation in various international 
 
 33. See Christians, Drawing the Boundaries of Tax Justice, supra note 4, at 72–77 
(explaining that under pressures from a globally integrated market economy, sovereign states 
have engaged in a de facto tranching of taxpayers into three distinct pools: the relatively “easy-
to-tax,” the relatively “hard-to-tax,” and the virtually “impossible-to-tax.” The easy-to-tax are 
thus because they are easily monitored by the state via third parties who transfer value to them; 
namely, those who earn most of their income in wages and are subject to payroll and 
consumption taxes. The hard-to-tax includes those who have the means and the wherewithal to 
escape detection by regulators, who internationally are aided by bank secrecy, among other 
practices. They are hard to catch, but most states try more or less to catch at least some of them 
on a regular basis, if only to keep up taxpayer morale. The impossible-to-tax are extremely 
high-net-worth individuals and sprawling multinational corporations that can legally avoid 
taxation via complex structures marketed to them by sophisticated tax planners. States face 
enormous challenges, many of which involve politics rather than capacity, in keeping this 
category of taxpayer in the tax net.). 
 34. More recently, the UK government reprimanded the Big Four accounting firms for 
initially playing “gatekeeper” by lending assistance to draft anti-avoidance legislation, and then 
subsequently for being “poachers” by systemically abusing their position by finding ways to do 
the very things that said legislative provisions were supposed to stop. See Julie Martin, UK 
Lawmakers Lambaste Big 4 Accounting Firms, 69 TAX NOTES INT’L 518 (2013).   
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networks—most notably the OECD—where access to lawmakers can 
be had in informal, mostly unobservable ways. While direct lobbying 
and some forms of political spending are increasingly well-
documented and subject to public scrutiny as well as systemic 
academic analysis,
35
 the other forms of political influence are just as 
pervasive, yet most are rarely acknowledged in scholarship on tax 
policymaking.
36
  
Because of this expansive influence on the legislative process, 
framing tax avoidance as a question of morality based on what 
legislators intend is therefore not only incapable of solving the 
problem of controlling taxpayer behavior, it is inviting a whole new 
host of interpretive barriers to designing such a solution. Determining 
lawmaker intent with respect to tax policy requires a holistic 
approach that is both pluralistic and globalized in nature. This adds 
tremendous difficulties to the already extensively documented 
problem of determining legislative intent in general.  
The OECD’s own role in articulating tax norms provides one 
example of the difficulty here. Lee Sheppard has argued that the 
OECD is principally responsible for at least three of the biggest tax 
base-eroding regimes in existence globally: the “treaty treatment of 
remote commerce . . . ; tax treatment of related-party financial 
transactions . . . ; [and] transfer pricing, especially separation of 
income from relevant activity . . . .”37 If the lawmaker’s intent marks 
the line between what is objectionable tax avoidance and what is not, 
these three regimes are problematic, to say the least.
38
  
 
 35. See, e.g., OPEN SECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org; Alexander et al., supra note 31.  
 36. For a discussion of native advertising, see, e.g., Eric Wemple, Politico’s Mike Allen, 
Native Advertising Pioneer, WASH. POST BLOG (Nov. 20 2013, 4:00 PM), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2013/11/20/politicos-mike-allen-native-advertising 
-pioneer/. There appears to be no scholarship to date measuring the extent to which native 
advertising has been used to influence tax policy, so this is a topic that is ripe for further study. 
For an overview of the OECD’s lobbying activities, in particular with relation to the G20, see 
Allison Christians, Taxation in a Time of Crisis: Policy Leadership from the OECD to the G20, 
5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 19 (2010).  
 37. Sheppard, News Analysis: OECD Tries to Fix Income Shifting, supra note 24. 
 38. See, e.g., David Spencer, Transfer Pricing: Will the OECD Adjust to Reality?, TAX 
JUST. NETWORK (2012), available at http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Spencer_ 
120524_OECD_.pdf; Michael Durst, The Two Worlds of Transfer Pricing Policymaking, 61 
TAX NOTES INT’L 439 (2011). 
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Articulating exactly what a lawmaking body intended in enacting 
any one of these regimes would be difficult. Taken together, one 
could rationally conclude that lawmakers in many of the OECD 
member countries intend not to tax very much of anything that 
touches international markets at all. If that is true, then much of the 
tax avoidance sought to be moderated with a moral requirement to 
abide by an assumed spirit of the law could be perfectly in line with 
that spirit. Troublingly, this is the case even if the spirit is implied 
from legislative intentions that go unstated for reasons having to do 
with the politics of self-preservation. Like native advertising, special 
interest group protection through favorable legislation is best 
accomplished when it is not done so overtly.
39
 Adjudicating taxpayer 
behavior on this basis provides no answer to the possibility that much 
tax legislation is in fact sponsored content. 
The problem of interpreting legislative intent is further thwarted 
by the crowding-out of alternative policy influences caused by an 
entrenched policy monopoly. This happens, for example, to the extent 
that the OECD, self-described as the world’s “market leader in tax 
policy,”40 quashes policymaking attempts by rival institutions.41 
Crowding out alternative viewpoints ensures institutional rigidity and 
adherence to status quo interests. It also ensures ongoing isolation of 
the issues facing poor countries in the global tax order.
42
 As Michael 
Durst, a former IRS official, puts it: 
I have frequently observed [lobbying at the OECD] at close 
hand, and I believe it has been influential. The effectiveness of 
lobbying efforts has been enhanced, I believe, by the absence 
of any financially interested constituency that might serve as 
 
 39. See, e.g., Charlie Warzel, The Real Problem with the Atlantic’s Sponsored Post 
Debacle Proves that Above All Else, Native Ads Need to Feel Native, ADWEEK (Jan. 15, 2013), 
http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/real-problem-atlantics-sponsored-post-146553. 
 40. See, e.g., OECD’S CURRENT TAX AGENDA (2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
ctp/OECDCurrentTaxAgenda2012.pdf.  
 41. Richard Murphy, OECD Should Step Down and Let UN Tackle Tax Havens Say Tax 
Justice Network and Action Aid, TAX RESEARCH UK (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.tax 
research.org.uk/Blog/2011/11/01/oecd-should-step-aside-and-let-un-tackle-tax-havens-say-tax-
justice-network-and-action-aid/. 
 42. See, e.g., Frances Horner, Do We Need an International Tax Organization?, 24 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 179 (2001).   
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an effective counterweight and therefore as a political force for 
changes to current laws.
43
 
Some activists have begun to point out the crisis for the rule of law 
on both a national and international level that is presented by this 
kind of political malfunction. For example, the Tax Justice Network 
has recently questioned the outsize influence on tax policy exercised 
by the OECD.
44
 As activists begin to tie legal tax avoidance by 
multinational actors to the connection between the impenetrable 
forum of international tax lawmaking and the inability of the public 
to monitor the outcomes of such lawmaking in practice,
45
 they will 
accordingly seek public accountability for the true cost of these 
regimes as a remedy.  
II. PLURALISM AND THE SOFT LAW PATH 
Because the message of legal tax avoidance is both complex and 
nuanced, and features behavior that is not obviously objectionable 
when compared to tax evasion, activists typically combine tax 
evasion and tax avoidance into a single category when presenting the 
problem to the public. For example, James Henry—an American tax 
justice activist who was formerly Director of Economic Research 
(chief economist) for McKinsey & Co.—states: 
Both evasion and avoidance have the same impact on the rest 
of us, which is, our tax burdens are greater because the truly 
rich are not paying their fair share: they are able to put their 
money abroad, and basically are able to take advantage of a 
system that allows a double non-taxation. And that’s a real 
problem.
46
 
 
 43. Durst, supra note 38, at 442.  
 44. Taxcast Edition 14, TAX JUST. NETWORK (Feb. 2013), available at http://www.tackle 
taxhavens.com/taxcast/. 
 45. For an anecdotal account of the difficulties related to observing OECD deliberations, 
see Allison Christians, What an OECD ‘Public Briefing’ Teaches About The Rule Of Law, TAX, 
SOC’Y & CULTURE (Feb. 18, 2013), http://taxpol.blogspot.com/2013/02/what-oecd-public-
briefing-teaches-about.html. 
 46. Carroll Trust, Gibraltar Offshore Accounts Tax Evasion Scandal, YOUTUBE (Nov. 14, 
2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cv6d9b9Z9C4.  
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Henry thus combines tax avoidance, which is the product of either 
intentional or inept (or both) rulemaking, with tax evasion, which is 
the product of taxpayers flouting the rules and governments not 
stopping them. This allows a single message to permeate the public 
consciousness; namely, that whether it is avoidance or evasion, 
taxpayers are misbehaving and they must be stopped.  
The intentionally pluralistic character of the last century of tax 
policy development serves as the basis for arguing that the rule of law 
must be central in the formulation of any solution to this problem. 
This pluralistic character is most clearly evidenced in the use by rich 
countries of non-legal methods to create and maintain the system in 
existence today, including facilitating the central role played by tax 
havens in the global financial system.
47
 Because the institutional and 
regulatory status quo constrains the capacity of governments to 
respond unilaterally to problems involving international taxation, the 
OECD—as its chief architect—has been criticized for perpetuating a 
democratic deficit in tax lawmaking, for skewing tax policy to favor 
its members and their constituencies, and for advancing an agenda 
that is inconsistent with other global social goals within the safely 
ensconced parameters of black-box policymaking.
48
  
Since the OECD is not a lawmaking body but instead deals in 
“norms” and “standards,” there exist in law no remedies for any of its 
perceived misdeeds, no matter how far-reaching or damaging. 
Anyone who disagrees with the OECD’s global grip over tax policy 
has little choice but to mount a challenge through another institution 
or mechanism that will inevitably be outmatched in financial and 
institutional support. Some may even be overtly thwarted in such an 
effort by those who seek to sustain the primacy of the OECD in 
preserving its own brand of tax policy against any would-be 
 
 47. Craig M. Boise & Andrew P. Morriss, Change, Dependency, and Regime Plasticity in 
Offshore Financial Intermediation: The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles, 35 TEX. INT’L L.J. 
377, 429 (2009); Tony Freyer & Andrew P. Morriss, Creating Cayman as an Offshore 
Financial Center: Structure & Strategy Since 1960, ARIZ. ST. L.J. (Sept. 22, 2013); RICHARD 
ECCLESTON, THE DYNAMICS OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, 
THE OECD AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL TAX COOPERATION 2 (2012); Christians, 
Networks, Norms, and National Tax Policy, supra note 13. 
 48. For a discussion of international constraints on national tax policy, see Allison 
Christians, Global Trends and Constraints on Tax Policy in the Least Developed Countries, 42 
U.B.C. L. REV. 239 (2010). 
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competitors. The OECD’s continued tax policy domination suggests 
that its member countries have to date been well served by using 
these non-legal methods to shape tax practices on the ground around 
the world. 
Given the massive resource difference between tax justice 
advocates and the OECD member governments, it seems clear the 
latter will employ their well-resourced and highly motivated 
supporting constituencies to clear the way for OECD-based policy 
views to continue to prevail. This power difference must be 
acknowledged as real, even while it is vigorously protested as a 
fundamentally unjust way to decide how states can and should 
exercise taxation, and continuously countered with comprehensively 
justice-oriented policy alternatives. Starting from the premise that the 
status quo is a product of decades of soft law, a convincing case can 
be made that governments can and should contain the mechanisms 
for controlling inappropriate behavior within the structure of law 
instead. 
III. USING LAW TO CONSTRAIN TAXPAYER BEHAVIOR 
When a government determines how to commandeer resources 
from the private sector for the public good, it seems important that 
the rule of law be involved in drawing the line between evasion, 
which is illegal, and avoidance, which is not. The line between 
avoidance and evasion, like many line-drawing exercises in tax or 
otherwise, is fraught with difficulties.
49
 But this is an argument for 
drawing this line not with soft law but rather with legal principles, 
continuously monitored and enforced through compliance with 
agreed-upon rules and standards, backed up by judicial review, to put 
the taxpayers on notice as to the behavioral expectations applicable to 
all. 
 
 49. See, e.g., David Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in Tax Law (Univ. 
of Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 62), available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/62.Weisbach.Line_.complete.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 
2014). 
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This is not to say that governments are or should be helpless 
against formalistic or “sophisticated” tax planning.50 Governments 
are clearly not helpless in this regard: this is the point and purpose of 
anti-abuse rules. These may be bright line rules, such as thin 
capitalization and beneficial ownership, or more flexible regimes that 
rely on weighing and balancing with judicial oversight as a backstop, 
such as general and specific anti-avoidance rules, sham and step 
transaction doctrines, and economic purpose tests.
51
 All of these are 
admittedly cumbersome ways to solve complex problems, but they 
are at least capable of collectively moving the tax system toward 
more coherence and consistency of application. 
In contrast, suggesting that the difference between illegal and 
legal cannot be established in law posits that while societies are 
incapable of articulating the parameters of acceptable conduct within 
the law, legal sanction will nevertheless be imposed for 
noncompliance. This implies that punishment can and will be meted 
out randomly, because judgments about taxpayer behavior will be 
made outside of the sphere of deliberative lawmaking and instead in 
the court of public opinion.  
Bypassing the legislative sphere as the proper place for making 
and enforcing decisions about civic responsibility shifts the duty of 
oversight away from governments and toward civil society writ large, 
which includes not just NGOs, activists, and others who may be 
interested in promoting tax justice or fairness but also all of the 
lobbyists, consultants, paid marketers and promoters, and other 
political actors who have their own agendas and many resources and 
mechanisms to advance them.  
 
 50. It is also not to suggest that tax advisors are themselves amoral actors, mere 
technicians, or automatons of any kind. They clearly are not, and professional standards are 
regularly set and enforced with respect to their behavior in statutory and administrative 
rulemaking, as well as private membership association regimes. See MICHAEL HATFIELD, THE 
ETHICS OF TAX LAWYERING (2d ed. 2011); Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner’s Perspective 
on Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax 
Shelters, 54 S.M.U. L. REV. 47 (2001). 
 51. The literature is vast on this topic. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither Economic 
Substance?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 389 (2010); Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Economic 
Substance and the Standard of Review, 60 ALA. L. REV. 339 (2009). 
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Assigning the problem of categorizing taxpayer behavior to the 
public in this manner has pernicious effects. The most troubling of 
these is that it releases legislators from responsibility too easily, 
allowing them to continue to benefit from sponsoring legislation that 
favors their constituencies while purporting to act in the interest of 
the public. But it also runs the serious risk of pushing against the path 
to good governance more systemically by turning too quickly to soft 
law without considering how to deal with the political influence 
problems that will inevitably persist, and may even worsen, in this 
scenario. Instead of turning to morality as a soft law backstop to an 
ongoing tax governance crisis, the better path seems to be the one 
most tax justice advocates recommend; namely, achieving expansive 
transparency in lawmaking processes so as to enable public 
monitoring of what the legal regime produces in terms of actual 
outcomes for taxpayers.  
IV. AVOIDANCE VS. EVASION AS THE BASE CASE  
FOR TRANSPARENCY 
Transparency has become a buzzword in international governance 
in general, so it is perhaps no surprise to see it mobilized by tax 
justice advocates. Given the technical complexity of the regimes in 
question, and how those regimes interact across borders to create the 
related yet distinct issues of evasion and avoidance, seeking 
transparency in international tax is no small feat. It will involve first a 
clear statement of the ills to be remedied—an elusive task, given the 
tradition of opacity and the prevalence of soft law, as well as non-
legal processes and institutions. It must then overcome the 
institutional hurdles presented by a global tax policy regime that 
restricts influence from outside the business community.  
But this is precisely where the intractable problem of drawing a 
line between tax avoidance and tax evasion may be viewed as an 
opportunity to achieve systemic reform. At least two systemic tax 
governance traditions could be challenged on the grounds that each 
leads to the public’s inability to distinguish between tax evasion and 
tax avoidance, and therefore each breaks down the legitimacy of tax 
law in the court of public opinion, thus furthering a cycle of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol44/iss1/8
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incoherent and uneven application of tax laws within and across 
societies. 
The first of these systemic tax governance traditions is the outsize 
influence of well-resourced special interest groups over tax 
lawmaking processes in both domestic and international settings. 
There is little doubt that tax policy suffers because too much policy 
influence is wielded by one particular sector; namely, the business 
community in the influential OECD member countries and their 
worldwide network of lawyers, accountants, and other advisers who 
are well paid and therefore highly motivated to serving in this effort. 
Far too much of this influence is being exerted in institutions and 
processes that are inaccessible to public view. This suggests, at 
minimum, that governments have accepted, contrary to social policy 
goals, an inappropriate amount of obscurity around the many ways in 
which well-resourced actors control the design and maintenance of 
tax systems across the globe.  
Many of the problems for tax policy posed by opacity in political 
influence are solvable as governance problems through the 
mechanism of transparency. In this case, the transparency 
contemplated includes the complete documentation with respect to all 
government officials—at all levels (national and international 
included)—of every meeting had with any person not in government, 
disclosing time spent, issues discussed, and every dollar received in 
the form of campaign support, issue support, or otherwise.  
This is more or less the working principle of various countries’ 
lobbying registries, as well as open meetings and access to 
information laws, but it envisions a more thorough public 
surveillance of interactions between government officials and the 
public, at all levels and in all capacities. This kind of transparency 
would enable public observation of the connection between political 
influence and fully compliant yet significantly low-taxed members of 
society, and therefore provide desperately needed data points for 
making the case for why full compliance with existing laws is not a 
benchmark for appropriate taxpayer behavior but rather a starting 
point for critical inquiry regarding the accountability of lawmakers to 
the broader public. 
A second systemic tax governance tradition that impedes the 
ability of the public to distinguish between tax evasion and tax 
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avoidance is the confidentiality accorded to taxpayers’ tax 
information. This confidentiality prevents the public from observing 
how the law on the books plays out on the ground, and therefore sows 
the seeds for outrage when the media exposes the tax affairs of yet 
another high profile member of society.  
Again, transparency is the obvious solution, this time in the form 
of public disclosure of certain kinds of tax information. While there is 
a case to be made for favoring confidentiality over publicity in the 
case of individuals,
52
 the same case has not been made for 
corporations. Tax disclosure reforms, with respect to both pertinent 
annual tax information and beneficial ownership, have long been 
advocated by academics and other tax policy observers, and the tax 
evasion/avoidance problem could serve as the reason to finally 
embrace sunlight with respect to this kind of information.  
Further bolstering the case for transparency, the uneven 
reputational risk of naming and shaming based on celebrity status or 
name brand visibility ought to motivate members of society whose 
tax affairs tell a different story to bring their governments to account 
for failing to delineate between tax avoidance and tax evasion in a 
comprehensive manner. To the extent that the targets of naming and 
shaming object to the charges of immorality and point to full 
compliance with all regulatory regimes, they should have no 
objection to a transparent system of governance that would allow the 
public to monitor tax policy outcomes on the ground.  
CONCLUSION 
The failure to coherently delineate between tax evasion and tax 
avoidance is not the product of legal impossibility but rather of 
governance failure. The answer to this governance failure is not to 
turn away from law by articulating a non-legal standard of behavior 
based in the language of morality, and then using this standard as a 
means to inflict legal sanctions. Instead, the answer is to demand 
more from the law, which means expecting more accountability in 
governance. This is not a revelation but a reminder of governance 
lessons already learned.  
 
 52. Joshua Blank, In Defense of Individual Privacy, 61 EMORY L.J. 265 (2011). 
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Transparency has always created pressure on governments to 
solve line-drawing problems; in tax policy, it is the same story. Tax 
transparency forces lawmakers to expand their engagement with 
society beyond their immediate sources of sponsorship by improving 
the feedback loop between lawmaking and policy monitoring. 
Mechanisms like public disclosure of tax-related data and broad 
public participation in tax law policymaking—at all levels and in all 
forms of governance—have the potential to dislodge rhetoric based 
on conjecture and deliver to the public the data needed for 
independent study of the tax system as it plays out in practice, rather 
than as it is suggested by the words placed in statutes by legislators 
whose intentions are ambiguous at best.  
It is precisely within the act of drawing a line between tax 
avoidance and evasion that the dire need for transparency most 
reveals itself. The idea that taxpayer behavior must be managed by 
law, rather than social sanction, rests fundamentally on the premise 
that tax policy can move toward greater coherence over time if the 
public persistently demands a means of monitoring lawmaking. 
Transparency, therefore, becomes a tool for forcing governments to 
distinguish between legal and illegal behavior within a regime that is 
capable of sustained public observation as well as participation that is 
itself observable—namely, the rule of law. The desperate need for an 
articulation of the difference between tax avoidance and tax evasion 
accordingly illustrates why transparency is consistently viewed as an 
essential requirement for the pursuit of tax justice. 
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